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2 Contested conceptualisations of Ethiopian statehood 
 
In this chapter, I discuss why I chose Ethiopia as a case through which to study state formation in 
Africa. Moreover, in working towards the ethnography of the state, this chapter, and this book in 
general, attempts to highlight and challenge several bodies of literature that, in various ways, focus 
on making sense of the nature and role of the state in Ethiopia. My analysis takes its point of 
departure from two difficulties faced when conceptualising the state in Ethiopia. One is the 
problem of pinpointing its location in African studies. Scholarly discussions about the state in sub-
Saharan Africa have tended to afford only a marginal place and level of analysis to the Ethiopian 
state because, for many scholars, it is considered an anomaly. In the first part of this chapter, I will 
make the opposite point: Ethiopia represents one sociocultural and political formation in a diverse 
continent. 
 
We also face the second problem of locating the historical and conceptual specificity of the 
Ethiopian state. Indeed, there is no shortage of historical literature relating to state formation in 
Ethiopia. But even the term ‘state’ is taken for granted by many as a very straightforward concept, 
to the extent that it was wilfully avoided or reduced to a mere reflection of ethnic politics. To move 
beyond this impasse, in the second part of the chapter, I address the following relevant questions: 
how can we locate the historical specificities of state formation in Ethiopia? Can we use the 
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category of state to describe the political systems over several centuries? Can we make a clean 
break and avoid employing the concept of state to explain historically specific collective politics? 
In addressing these questions, I highlight several bodies of literature across a wide range of 
disciplines – anthropology, history, politics, sociology, and so on. In so doing, however, my 
intention is not to provide a full account of the history of Ethiopia or debate how the Ethiopian 
state has evolved over time. Rather, my aim is to examine some of the dominant perspectives on 
the conceptualisation of the Ethiopian state in light of the book’s theoretical perspective, and 
establish the broad context for an ethnographic study. 
The	Ethiopian	state	in	African	studies	
In the introduction to Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: monarchy, revolution and the 
legacy of Meles Zenawi, Prunier and Ficquet (2015: 1) wrote: 
Ethiopia is a land which, like Israel or Tibet, is often thought of first and foremost through 
myths before it is seen as a real country. Many people who would have some difficulty in 
precisely pinpointing Ethiopia on a map of the world have nevertheless heard about our 
hominid ‘grandmother’ Lucy, the Ark of the Covenant, Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, the 
medieval quest for Prester John, as well as the more recent imperial figures of Menelik II and 
Haile Selassie I, the independence of the country during European imperialism in Africa, and 
the Lion of Judah, a symbol of sovereignty that has been used on covers of Rastafari reggae 
albums. The public at large also remember the images of recurrent famines that often end up 
negatively symbolizing Africa. The Power, the Glory and the Tragedies. Ethiopia is oversized 
in the public mind and it often tends to be oversized in the minds of its own inhabitants, who 
are the first to believe in the mythical quality of their motherland. It is one of the few countries 
in the world which has an Encyclopaedia devoted to it … 
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The ‘mythical quality’ that Prunier and Ficquet refer to is not only implanted in popular 
imaginations but also has long defined academic discourses surrounding the Ethiopian state. Many 
writers consider it to be ‘the oldest African country, yet in many respects it is in rather than of 
Africa’ (Jesman 1963: 10). Ethiopia has predominantly been seen as more oriental than African, 
so much so that ‘more is written on Ethiopia in the Journal of Semitic Studies than in the Journal 
of African History’ (Teshale 1995: xvi). The discussions about the state in Africa, largely informed 
by this perspective, are reluctant to consider Ethiopia as a fully African state. 
 
While political organisations in sub-Saharan Africa are predominantly conceptualised in relation 
to European colonial legacy, where the state is viewed as an imported alien supra-institution 
grafted onto indigenous social and political structures, Ethiopia is said to have maintained a 
culturally rooted state for more than three thousand years (Teshale 1995; Toggia 2008). Ethiopia, 
alone in the continent, successfully forestalled colonial domination and thereby avoided direct 
imposition of colonial institutions. As a result, the state is often bypassed in mainstream analysis. 
Jean-Francois Bayart (2009), for instance, treated Ethiopia as an exception on account of the 
existence of a long and continuous tradition of power that, he believes, does not correspond to the 
rest of the ‘Black African’ state experience.1 In his global order of cultural essentials, Samuel 
Huntington (1996: 47) described Ethiopia as a ‘civilisation of its own’ in contrast to the rest of 
sub-Saharan Africa, which, he argues, lacks a distinct indigenous civilisation. Teshale Tibebu 
(1995: 31), an Ethiopian historian and advocate of Afrocentric analysis of Ethiopia’s past, wrote: 
Ethiopia is not like Chad or Burkina Faso, Central African Republic or Malawi — a piece of 
territory carved out by a European power and given a name. Ethiopia is like Egypt, China, 
Iran; very old, but also very young. True, Ethiopia did not have the same degree of 
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centralization as ‘seventy-centuries-old’ Egypt. It was more akin to China, where parcellized 
and centralized sovereignties changed place intermittently, as dynasties rose and fell within 
its cultural universe. 
Although Teshale acknowledges that Ethiopia possesses some of the attributes linked to African 
states, he saw the organisational form and history of the Ethiopian state as fundamentally different 
from those of its African counterparts. Much of the literature on the state in Africa generally 
identifies, the Ethiopian state as a ‘state’ in the true Weberian sense of the term, unlike the African 
state, which is described as neither ‘African nor state’ but as, instead, 
a dubious community of heterogeneous and occasionally clashing linguistic, religious and 
ethnic identities; their claim to force is rarely effective and much less monopolistic; their 
frequent predatory nature fails the test of legitimacy; and their territoriality is generally at best 
hesitant and contested. 
(Englebert 1997: 767) 
Postcolonial African states, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) argue, do not have a legitimate monopoly 
on the means of violence in their territorial jurisdictions; therefore, Weber’s empirical definition 
is insufficient to adequately explain their nature and survival. Rather, they are juridical entities 
protected by international law. Ethiopia, on the other hand, is described as ‘the lone continental 
exception to juridical sovereignty’ (Englebert 2009: 155). 
 
Indeed, the Ethiopian state is relatively specific in the sense that, unlike the rest of the sub-Saharan 
African states, its historical trajectory includes no experience of colonialism. However, although 
it remained independent throughout European colonial rule in Africa and developed a long-lasting 
 5 
and relatively well-organised political system, this does not necessarily indicate that it is organised 
differently from the rest of Africa (Donham and James 1986). Most significantly, the appropriation 
of European instruments of rule, as I demonstrate later, by the ruling elites in Ethiopia and the rest 
of Africa, which resulted in the centralisation of state power in the nineteenth century, generated 
parallel structures and trajectories in the contemporary era. 
 
Recent studies have shown that colonialism neither suspended the historicity of African societies 
nor lessened their capacity to pursue strategies to produce their modernity (Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Bayart 2009). Instead, it brought political, economic, and military access to the dominant 
indigenous groups. African actors seized an open opportunity introduced by colonisers, traders, 
and missionaries to amass wealth and gain power. Therefore, Africa was not just a passive victim 
of colonialism but also active in the pursuit of economic gains through what Bayart (2009) terms 
strategies of ‘extraversion’ – a process through which political actors are disposed to mobilise 
resources from their relationship with the external environment as a result of weak productivity 
and internal social struggle. 
 
In a comparable way, despite the claim of three centuries of state experience, it was the import of 
exogenous ideas such as mechanisms of the modern bureaucratic machinery, the adoption of 
modern European law (the penal and civil code that was introduced in 1958), and the notion of 
constitutionalism that profoundly moulded Ethiopia’s current shape.2 While it was colonialism that 
introduced new areas of domination – both ideological and technological – to the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa, the indigenous elite, particularly Emperor Menelik and Haile Selassie I, have been 
credited with the introduction of modern instruments of rule in Ethiopia (Bahru 1991; Andreas 
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2003). As Addis Hiwet (1975) observed, imperialism offered the Ethiopian elite ‘real advantages 
in the modification, rationalisation and organisation of a modern state apparatus – ministers and 
bureaucracies and military power … their own socio-economic needs were more than sufficiently 
catered by the goods of the world capitalist system’ (78). The desire of the ruling class to 
‘modernise’ itself, i.e. to imbibe the Western system of knowledge and lifestyle, and the ambition 
to create a European modernity (Clapham 2006), was important in shaping the state. 
 
In this sense, the centralisation of Ethiopian state power was realised in the same way that it was 
realised in other sub-Saharan African countries, where, as Bayart (2009) tells us, foreign contact 
and the appropriation of European modes of rule were a major resource for ‘the centralisation of 
power and accumulation of wealth’ (23). One can include Ethiopia in Bayart’s claim that the 
articulation of African politics and societies, in this particular context, ‘could no longer be 
distanced from the technological civilisation of the West’ (24). The substantive difference seems 
to be more the mode of the appropriation of exogenous institutions and ideologies. While this was 
direct colonial intrusion through conquest in the rest of ‘Black Africa’, in Ethiopia the state elite 
was responsible for the appropriation of the ideologies and institutions of Europeans through 
strategies of ‘extraversion’. 
 
Such parallel trajectories have contributed to the emergence of comparable political processes and 
economic conditions in both the Ethiopian state and other sub-Saharan African states. As such, 
Ethiopia possesses most of the characteristic features that are currently used to identify Africa: 
ethnic and religious diversity, poverty, famine, indigenous polity, economic growth, and so on. 
However, I do not want to imply that colonialism and the incorporation of global resources and 
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technologies within a state are similar. As mentioned earlier, Ethiopia possesses a  distinctive 
history of state formation that distinguishes it from the rest of Africa. I further acknowledge the 
immense importance of its peculiar features (the presence of a specific tradition of power, the 
conceptualisation of politics through ‘graphic reasoning’ (Bayart 2009), and so on) in shaping its 
composition and the popular ideas of the state. Yet, viewing Ethiopia as an exception based on 
such traits and counterposing it with the rest of the sub-Saharan African states presupposes that 
the latter is a singular category. 
 
It is important to note here that much of the discussion in the literature regarding postcolonial 
African states and Ethiopian exceptionalism is based on the assumption that colonialism had a 
homogenising effect throughout the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, however, scholars have 
raised questions about the homogenising effect of colonialism, pointing out that ‘the influence and 
effects of colonialism have been extremely varied throughout post-colonial Africa’, and as a result 
‘pre-existing diversities – although hardly unchanging – persisted throughout and beyond the 
colonial interlude’ (Harrison 2010:15). Thus, Ethiopian exceptionalism becomes less convincing 
as one questions the importance of the homogenising effect of colonialism on the composition and 
nature of the postcolonial Africa states. If anything, the Ethiopian state represents one sociocultural 
and political formation in a diverse continent. Therefore, rather than viewing it as an anomaly, this 
study takes Ethiopia as a case through which to elucidate how the state is constituted in the 
mundane materiality of everyday life. However, Ethiopia is not taken as a representative case, that 
is, this study does not attempt to make any empirical generalisation on either African states or 
Ethiopia. Rather, it aims to outline those principles that underlie the modus operandi of the state, 
which can be analytically and theoretically significant in understanding the state in Africa. 
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The	conceptualisation	of	the	state	in	Ethiopia	
This section discusses the conceptualisation of the Ethiopian state. It provides important 
background information and insights into problems with the existing literature. It does this by 
bringing together an ambitious set of dispersed literature from different disciplinary fields and 
presenting them thematically. 
The	great	tradition	
Much has been written about the historical origins of the Ethiopian state. One predominant and 
classical approach, known as the ‘Greater Ethiopia’, provides an account of a transcendental state. 
This conceptualisation is anchored in a historical metanarrative of what Christopher Clapham 
(2002a) aptly termed ‘the great tradition’ – a belief in the continuity of ancient state tradition. The 
‘great tradition’ projects an image of a long territorially unified state into the biblical past. 
 
The core narrative of ‘the great tradition’ oeuvre often begins with Aksum, an ancient kingdom 
that flourished in the present-day Tigray province of Ethiopia and Eritrea between the first and 
seventh centuries, as the first recognisable Ethiopian state. Aksum is seen as a ‘bedrock state’, so 
much so that the origin of the institutions of imperial Ethiopia, such as the office of the Emperor 
and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Clapham 1969), as well as Christian culture, the ox-plough 
agricultural system, and Ethiopic script, are imputed to it. The narrative continues linearly to relate 
the history of the fall of Aksum and the rise of what is considered an ‘illegitimate’ non-Solomonic3 
dynasty known as the Zagwe, whose extraordinary achievement and enduring legacy is the 
construction of rock-hewn churches. By 1270 the ‘legitimate’ Solomonic dynasty was restored, 
and it consolidated state power, expanded its territory, and defended itself against its historic 
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enemies – its Muslim and Pagan neighbours – for the ensuing six centuries until its last emperor, 
Haile Selassie I, was deposed in 1974. After the fall of the Solomonic dynasty in 1974, history 
continued to serve to reify the state by narrating the story of the military regime that was in place 
until 1991 and the Federalist regime that has been in place since 1991 (Marcus 1994; Clapham 
2002a; Toggia 2008). 
 
In line with the dominant Western perception of Ethiopia as an orientalist civilisation, early 
scholars and philologists attempted to codify a liner history of its statehood based on their 
encounter with the Geez high scriptural traditions that had produced the bulk of historiographic 
texts (see, for example, Ludolf 1684; Jones and Monroe 1955; Tadesse 1972; Sergew 1972; 
Ullendorff 1973). Many of these studies present historically disparate sets of activities, political 
discourses, and institutions as a coherent and unified political entity contained within the concept 
of ‘state’. The problem is that, in this historiographic articulation, the Ethiopian state becomes a 
punitive discourse. The account simply banishes and glosses over germane anecdotes of 
governance practices among non-Christian communities and occupational groups, and informal 
and alternative political power structures, such as banditry,4 traditional political systems, and the 
historically variable territoriality of various political entities. Political writers and historians 
working within this tradition invariably use the notion of state to refer to all ‘kingdoms and empires 
in ancient and medieval periods, as well as the modern Ethiopian states’ (Toggia 2008: 331). In 
other words, the modern concept of the state is simply projected onto the historical past, and, as 
such, the Ethiopian state is represented more as an already formed and organised trans-historical 
entity that evolves linearly and steers the course of social life than as a social formation produced 
at a specific and recent historical juncture or one that is in a constant process of construction based 
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on social struggles and cultural idioms. This approach suffers from what Derek Sayer (1987) calls 
the ‘violence of abstraction’, that is, the disentanglement of concepts from historical facts. 
In general, the Ethiopian state has historically displayed a tendency toward diversity. This is not 
to say that communities did not have shared cultural notions of the state. Rather, the point is that 
the state naturally signifies multiplicity as well as unity. Hence, attending to Ethiopia’s legacy of 
political diversity keeps us from reproducing a totalising nationalist teleology or restricting its 
statehood to one socio-political formation. 
 
In a typical Western epistemology of the time, the grandiose assertions of the great tradition thesis 
subsequently enabled Ethiopist scholars to construct a civilizational hierarchy, which orders 
cultural differences in Ethiopia into systems of centre and periphery: between Christian and non-
Christian communities, Semites and non-Semites, and Geeze civilisation and barbarian traditions 
(see, for example, Ludolf 1684; Ullendorff 1973). This language was furthermore linked to racial 
category – in particular, in terms of a nested set of racial oppositions between Semitic immigrants 
and members of African tribes: 
… the Ethiopian Empire of the twentieth century consists of a number of previously 
autonomous and distinct ‘African’ tribes subordinated under an alien Semitic minority. This 
view is a natural consequence of beginning Ethiopian history, as scholarly convention has had 
it, with the supposed Semitic immigrations of the first millennium B.C. (Levine 2000: 26) 
Thus, the Ethiopian state is understood as a bifurcated structure, as we shall see when we examine 
the centre-periphery approach, which found its expression in a sharp civilisational split based on 
tradition, culture (Christian and non-Christian), and space (highland and lowland). The result is 
that, in the words of Christopher Clapham (2002a: 40–41), the Abyssinians, ‘notably those who 
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speak Amharic and Tigrinya’, are constructed as true ‘Ethiopia, whereas other peoples [are seen 
to be] […] part of Ethiopia’. 
 
The idea that a centralised state with roots in Abyssinian core remains central to contemporary 
Ethiopian scholarship (Donham and James 1986; Clapham 1988, 2017; Bahru 1991, Teshale 1995; 
Markakis 2011). While most contemporary critical studies reject the Semitic thesis, they present 
an image of the state that is organized around what Teshale Tibebu (1995) calls ‘Geeze 
civilization’. As I will show later in this chapter, the orientalist construction of cultures of power 
remained in the realm of the undisputed, even for ethnographers. 
The	great	man	approach	
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the study of state and society had been ignored by 
Ethiopianist scholars in their drive to account for the personhood and power of the great emperors. 
This tradition was set in motion, according to Markakis (2011: 20), by Thomas Carlyle’s (1841) 
‘hero-worship’ approach, which inspired numerous ‘encomiastic portraits of past leaders’, 
especially of Haile Selassie. Many scholars working in this tradition, as Bahru Zewde (2008) 
remarks, were infatuated with the late Machiavellian Emperor and so eschewed any broad social 
analysis. The state, rather, was predominantly discussed in relation to the purportedly 
‘modernizing zeal’ (Perham 1969: 62) of a man who is said to have ‘shaped rather than waited 
upon events’ (Mosley 1965: 151). Even Halliday and Molyneux (1981), who took a structuralist 
political economy approach to the study of Ethiopia, said that ‘the history of modern Ethiopia has 
to a considerable degree been encapsulated in the biography of the man who, for many years, ruled 
it and represented it to the outside world.’ Haile Selassie is represented as the ‘singular and 
transcendental’ figure of a Machiavellian prince (Foucault 1991: 91) who embodied not only the 
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state but also its history and rules to maintain personal control over his territory. While his 
progressive view (which Bahru Zewde (2008) rather scathingly characterised as ‘panegyric of 
money’) contributed to the transformation of the imperial government, it is too reductionist to 
regard the monarch as a ‘quintessence of the state’ (Raphaeli 1967: 422) and study him instead of 
the state and society. In these studies, analysis of the state is highly tethered to what Foucault 
(1991) conceptualised as a sovereign understanding of power – i.e. power is assumed to be a 
centralised force wielded by great emperors who oppress, impose laws, and build institutions. 
The	modern	state:	two	approaches5	
Over the years, scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines – history, political science, 
anthropology, etc. – have paid a great deal of attention to the genesis of the modern Ethiopian 
state. The emphasis of these studies has broadly been on the making of imperial Ethiopia, 
especially on the nature and consequences of Menelik’s conquest6 of the south during the last 
quarter of the 19th century. In order to describe the conquest, many scholars draw on a wide range 
of aphorisms and appellations, including ‘enlargement of the state’ (Markakis 2011), ‘imperial 
expansion’ (Donham 1986), colonisation (Holcomb and Ibssa 1990), ‘military feudal colonialism’ 
(Addis Hiwet 1975), and restoring and uniting the ‘medieval territories of Ethiopia’ (Teffera 1997: 
37) that were lost in the aftermath of Gragn and Oromo expansion7 (Getachew 1986). These 
aphorisms, broadly speaking, are expressions of a wide range of divergent and competing views 
and positions on the Ethiopian state. 
 
Most of these writings can be placed in two major categories: modernist or constructivist and 
critical. However, the distinction between these two approaches is a very rough-and-ready one. 
The approaches constitute two broadly overlapping realms of literature. The constructivist 
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perspective imagines the Ethiopian state as a somehow modern phenomenon, which is mainly 
associated with statist institutional practices, conquest, and war (Donham 1986; Clapham 1988; 
Bahru 1991; Keller1991; Teshale 1995). Clapham (1988), for example, locates the emergence of 
the modern state within a set economic, political, and social shifts, and transformations wrought 
by modernity and direct contact with Europe. This involved the introduction of ‘a standing army, 
ministerial bureaucracies, national taxation, and a codified law to protect landed elites’ (Donham 
1986: 25), and the transformation of what had been the traditional elite into a European-educated 
bureaucratic elite. This process, Clapham argues, ensured that Ethiopia would be recognised as a 
‘sovereign jurisdiction existing on terms of formal equality’ (1988: 26–27) with European states. 
This socio-political development has led to further discussions among Ethiopianists concerning 
where it fits in the international system of states. Bahru Zewde (2008), for instance, drew 
comparisons between imperial Ethiopia and Perry Anderson’s late European absolutist states 
during their transition from feudalism to capitalism. Similarly, Teshale Tibebu (1995:30) sought 
to investigate: ‘In the global survey of modern state formations …. Where does the Ethiopian 
variety fit in?’ In brief, Teshale claims that the Ethiopian state fits within three different models: 
‘the modern Western, the historic old states, and the new fragile states of nineteenth-century 
Africa’ (49). 
 
Moving away from model-driven approaches, others sought to explain the contradiction between 
structural changes brought about by rationalisation of the state and traditional patterns of social 
organisation in the late imperial period. The paradoxical structural transformations that the 
Ethiopian state system underwent from 1896 to 1974 – namely, ‘the creation of a stronger and 
more centralised bureaucratic state and the increasing commercialisation of the economy’ 
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(Donham 1986: 25) on the one side, and the concomitant entrenchment of the ancient aristocratic 
class system on the other – has made scholars question the liberalising and modernising capacity 
of the state as an actor. Many have concluded that the imperial state’s capacity to modernise society 
and transform the economy (especially the agricultural sector) was impaired by its ‘semi-
bureaucratised’ structure (Gebru 1996), i.e. by contradictions between ‘commercial purists and 
patron-client relationships’ (Donham 1986). 
 
Writing about class and revolution, Markakis and Nega (1986) described the late imperial state as 
beset by a conjunction of national and class antagonisms. The first, they argue, was a product of 
the strain caused by the imperial expansion into the south and the subsequent drive by national 
leaders to centralise state power. Second, they saw class antagonism as a product of the 
introduction and expansion of Western capitalism. They argued that the foreign domination of the 
economic sector prevented the formation of a national bourgeoisie and radicalized the petty 
bourgeoisie (the salariat in the public and private sectors, and the self-employed in the retail trade. 
They argue that this group, along with the students, was able to find a ‘common cause with the 
workers and the peasants’ (53) by politicising the issues of land and worker exploitation. This laid 
the groundwork for the revolution of 1974. Similarly, Halliday and Molyneux (1981) saw 
contradictions between the advanced administrative system and the backward economy producing 
the conditions that would lead to the demise of the imperial state. Writing about the cause of the 
1974 revolution, Halliday and Molyneux (1981) described imperial Ethiopia in terms of radical 
division between two economic sectors: the agricultural sector, which was attached to the pre-
capitalist mode of production and administration system, and the industrialising sector, represented 
by the expansion of industries in urban areas and large-scale commercial farms in some rural areas: 
 15 
 
The state apparatus became a partial promoter of capitalist development and, at the same 
time, the site of a conflict between groups associated with this capitalist development and 
those associated with the pre-capitalist order. The gulf thus created within the state was to 
be more than a reflection of the conflicts within the socio-economic formation as a whole; it 
became the politically most acute contradiction within Ethiopian society, the conflict that 
was to determine the fall of the ancient regime and the nature of the new post-revolutionary 
system (Halliday and Molyneux: 198169–70). 
 
The immediate social conditions included a wave of student protests and public demonstrations 
over a 50-per cent oil price hike, corrupt officials, and the infamous deadly famine in the north, 
the victims of which the emperor allegedly said defamed his reputation by dying of famine (de 
Waal 1991: 57). Halliday and Molyneux (1981) argued that it was not these conditions but the 
insoluble contradictions in the state system that produced a ‘revolution from above’ in 1974. 
While many scholars within the modernist tradition have studied state transformation, some 
analysts of the Derg period focussed on historical continuity in state representation. A number of 
writers have suggested that the idea of an ancient Ethiopian state and its ‘message of domination’ 
was appropriated and portrayed by the Derg during the regime’s revolution period. In his book 
Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution, Donald Donham (1999) 
outlines how spectacular ritual and pageantry formed an essential part of the state’s authority. He 
describes an occasion in 1984 in which the Derg organised a splendid celebration for the tenth 
anniversary of the revolution at a cost of US $50 million dollars. One of the programmes involved 
a museum exhibit: 
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The exhibit was placed along a wall, in front of which a red carpet led viewers from one 
installation to the next. The first stop was the bones that American palaeontologist Donald 
Johanson had found in Hadar, Ethiopia, of an individual he named Lucy (after the Beatles’ 
song), supposedly the earliest evidence of our hominid ancestors … After [which] came 
photographs of stelae from the earliest civilisation in Ethiopia, Axum. After Axum came the 
famous rock church of Lalibela from the twelfth century. The exhibit continued to the battle 
of Adwa in 1896, in which Ethiopia defeated Italy and thereafter, alone in Africa, managed to 
remain politically independent during most of the twentieth century. Finally came the 
overthrow of Haile Sellassie in 1974 (1999: 14–15). 
Progressing through the exhibition from beginning to the end clearly showed Ethiopia as a cradle 
of humanity and attempted to sustain the powerful myth of a trans-historic idea of the state. 
Moreover, the Derg appropriated the symbolism of imperial power as integral to the idea of the 
ancient Ethiopian state. In this regard, Clapham (1988: 79) draws a parallel between Mengistu 
Haile Mariam and Haile Selassie: 
In the time of the imperial regime, it was common to see pictures in which Father, Son and 
Holy Ghost, enthroned in the clouds, projected a beam of light onto the emperor (symbolically 
situated at mid-point between heaven and earth), who in turn diffused it to a waiting people. 
At the tenth anniversary celebrations [of the Ethiopian revolution] along with the official 
decorations provided by the North Koreans, it was also possible to find homemade tributes in 
which the gift of grace, embodied in a celestial trinity of Marx, Engels and Lenin, similarly 
descended to the graceful masses by way of Megistu Haile-Mariam. 
Similarly, David Korn (1986: 107), who was in charge of the American embassy in Addis Ababa 
at the time, observed: 
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… in his rare public appearances in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian leader sits on a kind of throne, 
a red velvet upholstered gold-lacquered chair emplaced above and in front of the less ornate 
seats provided for the other senior figures of the regime. In these and in other ways, Mengistu 
Haile Mariam can be looked upon as a monarch, an emperor, a successor to Haile Selassie and 
to Menelik. 
According to Paul Henze (2000), in an attempt to project himself as a champion of Ethiopian unity 
(and a guardian of the ancient Ethiopian state idea), Mengistu compared himself to the fiery 18th-
century Emperor Tewodros II, who initiated the unification of the country following its 
fragmentation by provincial warlords. I. M. Lewis (1983: 8) also commented that Mengistu’s 
obsessions with staging state ceremonies on the statue of Menelik was ‘hardly accidental’ but 
rather a projection of equivalence with his ‘illustrious predecessor, the founder of the expanded 
Ethiopian empire.’ More generally, these spectacles, through their performance and cultural 
projection of power and tradition, stressed the continuity of the idea of the historic Ethiopian state. 
The critical approach stands in sharp contrast to the description of Ethiopian statehood offered by 
the modernist/constructivist approach. Much of this scholarship focusses on issues of ethnic 
identity, nation, and nationalism, and how these are related to the historical narrative of Ethiopian 
statehood. Characteristic of this approach is revisiting the Ethiopian past and attempting to provide 
more nuanced and variegated accounts of its history – particularly with a view to critiquing 
essentialist notions of statehood. The work of Holcomb and Ibssa (1990), for instance, complicates 
the constructivist/modernist narrative by highlighting state practices of domination. They 
described Ethiopia as a ‘dependent colonial empire’ created as a result of an alliance formed 
between European capitalist states (Britain, France, and Italy) and the Abyssinian kingdom in the 
interests of the former. They argue that the state is not an ancient indigenous entity but rather as 
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much a child of colonialism as any other African state, spared from direct subjugation because it 
was an agent for colonial powers in the Horn of Africa: 
Ethiopia is the name that was eventually given to the geographic unit created when Abyssinia, 
a cluster of small kingdoms in northeast Africa, expanded in the mid-1800s by conquering 
independent nations in the region using firearms provided by European power (1). 
The predominant image of the state in such discussions of Ethiopian politics and history is that of 
an alien force imposing itself upon independent ethnic nationalities (see Asafa 1993; Sorenson 
1993; Mohammed 1994; Baxter, Hultin and Triulzi 1996; Mekuria B. 1996; Leenco 1999). These 
studies bring to the fore the question of national and cultural oppression, and other forms of 
inequality inherent in the state system, which have been disguised by the grand ‘great tradition’ 
narrative. There is, however, a profound irony in this approach to Ethiopian statehood and 
historiography because of its structural similarity to the Manchurian discourse of Semitic/non-
Semitic dichotomy propound by the great tradition writers. A number of scholars have simply 
turned the orientalist epistemology on its head by adopting the same flawed and essentialising 
approach to Ethiopian statehood that objectifies linguistic and cultural differences. Their sweeping 
critique of the great tradition thesis has much in common with the cultural and ethno-nationalist 
assertion of indigeneity and epistemology (see Surafel 2018). 
 
Other studies undertaken by scholars such as Merera (2006), Vaughan (2003), Yates (2009), and 
Abbink (1997) focus their argument on the complexity of the interface between state power and 
ethnicity. For example, with respect to the Oromo, Merera (2006: 104) wrote, ‘the irony of Oromo 
history therefore is that they were among of the conquerors and the conquered, that they produced 
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kings and queens while at the same time reduced to “gabbar” (serf) and tenants alienated from the 
land of their ancestors’. 
 
To conclude, it seems that thus far, at the centre of Ethiopian studies about the state, society, and 
governance lies the question of whether we have to conceptualise the state in terms of a broad 
historical continuum of some two thousand years or whether it has to be understood as a ‘dependent 
colonial’ entity carved out to meet European imperial interest or as a set of institutions dominated 
by class and ethnic interests and yet separate from and acting upon society. Although extremely 
rich and interesting, most of these studies have offered only a top-down analysis of the state in 
Ethiopia. They pay little attention to local governance practices or to how the people interact and 
negotiate with the state authority. In their attempt to historicise the Ethiopian state, they have 
become susceptible to sweeping generalisations, and, as a consequence, they conceal dispersed 
and localised patterns of governance practices. 
Centre-periphery	approach	
Another perspective often take to study Ethiopian statehood is the frontier, centre-periphery 
approach. This, according to Donald Donham (1986: 4), ‘connects centre to periphery, and so 
provides a way of linking the history and social anthropology’. Scholars working within this 
framework define the Ethiopian centre as the locus of state power which is constituted through the 
cultural idioms of Orthodox Christian followers of the Amharic- and Tigrinya-speaking groups of 
highland Ethiopia. The periphery, on the other hand, is seen to be the marginal domain of non-
Abyssinian groups who are identified in terms of their physical proximity to the capital, Addis 
Ababa, as a nodal point of communication, their level of incorporation to the state structure and 
their degree of self-identification with the ‘Greater Ethiopia’ myth (see Clapham 2002a). This 
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cleavage is understood to be the most important defining feature of the Ethiopian state and history 
(see Donham 1986; Clapham 2017). 
 
However, Donald Donham (2002) also wrote that, with the secession of Eritrea and a large number 
of Ethiopians’ being abroad, the shape of its space has shifted from ‘a hierarchical arrangement of 
cores and peripheries’, a political dynamic that ‘remained stable for roughly three-quarters of a 
century’ up until the 1974 revolution, into ‘a more open series of interactions drawing upon 
partially shared and intersecting “ethnoscapes” of the imagination’ (2). He suggested James Scott’s 
concept of ‘mapping’ as an alternative approach to the study of the state. Christopher Clapham 
(2002b) made use of this concept and provided a cogent analysis on how Haile Selassie and the 
Derg and EPRDF regimes attempted to spatially reconstitute the Ethiopian state. He coined the 
concept of ‘encadrement’ or ‘incorporation into structures of control’ to explain how the Derg 
regime controlled its territory through land distribution, villagisation, state farms, and other 
projects. 
 
The centre-periphery perspective, however, gained renewed interest after the publication of 
Markakis’s (2011) book Ethiopia: the last two frontiers. In this book, Markakis argues that, instead 
of geography, the centre should be seen in terms of a monopoly over power and the state apparatus, 
and the periphery should be seen in terms of its relative absence. He identifies two frontiers in the 
periphery: the highland periphery and the lowland periphery. While the Ethiopian state is 
successful, he argues, in both politically and economically integrating the highland periphery, the 
‘integration process has barely begun’ in the lowland periphery: 
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… neither the civil code nor the penal codes of the state have much currency here, every man 
is armed, no one pays taxes and the people rely on themselves and traditional leaders for justice 
… the people subsist on the side of the state, outside the national economy, cut off from 
highland society and culture, and at the whim of a political system whose periodic dramatic 
swings they scarcely comprehend (16–17). 
Underlying this conceptualisation and characterisation seems to be an understanding of the state 
in terms of the existence of bureaucratic institutions. However, as Nielsen (2007) pointed out, in 
the case of Mozambique, local understandings of state exist even in the relative absence of 
government institutions. This approach therefore fails to recognise that the state is more than a 
physical political structure. Moreover, in most Ethiopian peripheries, the absence of government 
institutions has not kept the government from collecting taxes or making its presence felt through 
recurrent military incursions (Hagmann and Korf 2012). 
 
A similar approach of a centre-periphery binary is used in the recent work of Christopher Clapham 
(2017) as a fundamental factor in the process of state-building in the Horn of Africa. Such an 
approach, from the point of view of this study, is fraught with the problem of what Joel Migdal 
(2001: 199) termed the ‘beachhead imagery’, an analytical construct in which a ‘Great tradition’ 
or the centre – the beachhead of change – is assumed to impose its will over the periphery. People 
at the periphery are depicted as lacking agency and only passive ‘… recipients of commands and 
of beliefs which they do not themselves create or cause to be diffused, and of those who are lower 
in the distribution or allocation of rewards, dignities, facilities, etc.’ (Shils 1982: 59). In other 
words, the relationship between the centre and the periphery is seen only in terms of a relationship 
of control, domination, or isolation. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in the following section, 
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such a perspective has significant implications for critical engagements with an essentialist concept 
of political culture because many scholars juxtapose practices of Abyssinian political culture with 
‘egalitarian’ traditions of ‘peripheral’ societies. 
Abyssinian	culture	and	state	formation	
Some of the most detailed studies on Ethiopia have focussed on political culture, including the 
classic works of Donald Levine (1965a, 1965b, 2000) and Allan Hoben (1970). While scholars 
working within this approach, as I will demonstrate later, have not explicitly theorised on the state, 
they do describe the political culture around which the Ethiopian state is organised and the 
mechanisms and system of meaning through which ordinary people make sense of politics, social 
relations, and state institutions. 
 
In what follows, I elaborate on the ideas of Donald Levine. I have chosen to focus on Levine 
because of his substantial influence on those working on Ethiopian politics, society, and history. 
In his article Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism (1965b), Levine outlined the cultural 
conditions that inform political life in North Ethiopia. He begins with the argument that since 
Ethiopia was ruled by the Amhara for such a long period, any attempt to understand its politics 
should start with the ‘fact of Amhara dominance’ (248). He states, ‘… the ideas, symbols, and 
values which govern Ethiopian politics are drawn from Amhara culture. The national politics of 
Ethiopia have on the whole been shaped in accordance to what may be called Amhara political 
culture …’ He further points to three features that define Amhara political culture: ‘orientation to 
authority, to human nature and to polity’, which, he believes, ‘have changed very little over the 
centuries8’. Regarding the first component, authority, as an essential defining characteristic of the 
Amhara political culture, Levine (1965b: 250) wrote: 
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… the complex of beliefs, symbols and values regarding authority constitute a key component 
of Amhara political culture. Throughout Amhara culture appears the motif that authority as 
such is good: indispensable for the well-being of society and worthy of unremitting deference, 
obeisance, and praise. Every aspect of Amhara social life is anchored in some sort of 
relationship to authority figures, and the absence of such a relationship evokes feelings of 
incompleteness and malaise. 
He draws our attention to the pervasiveness of hierarchy in a whole range of social contexts, 
including family relations, manners during mealtimes, obedience to parental authority, in 
children’s playing groups (dominated by the eldest), school discipline, and gestures of respect to 
superiors (250–252). For Levine, the exercise of authority in social and family relationships in the 
Amhara society resembles that found in institutional contexts: ‘the household is less a family unit 
than it is a vertically ordered set of status-roles’ (2000: 123). He describes the nature of life in 
Amhara society as ‘highly political in that the wielding of authority is a basic and pervasive feature 
of their social relationships’ (1965b: 251). 
 
The second component has to do with the Amhara conception of human nature, which Levine 
characterised as ‘realistic humanism’. Levine argues that this view is ‘radically unegalitarian’ 
(257) and that this is reinforced by the Amhara fatalistic conception of the universe. He argues that 
Edel, or fate, which has to be accepted, is tethered to divine authority and conceived of as more 
important than human effort. This buttresses ‘a disposition to respect and obey figures of authority’ 
(261). The wider political implication, he emphasised, is that ‘society no more than human nature 
is to be made the object of systematic efforts to apply transcendent principles or to transform the 
status quo’, so the process of governing is based on the ability ‘to accept such conflicts and strains 
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as exist and to work, by skilful manipulation, adjudication, and occasional coercion, to maintain a 
minimum of order and retributive justice’ (261). 
 
Finally, Levine draws attention to national politics by suggesting that the Amhara culture does not 
value ‘the notion of civil community’ (262). Thus, social cohesion is maintained by a ‘sharing of 
common religious, territorial and linguistic identifications’, and ‘subordination to individual 
authority figures’ (262). On the other hand, Levine argues, national sentiment is tied to the tradition 
of the monarch and to that of the church. Taken together, the three elements representing the 
Amhara political culture, ‘furthered the establishment of legitimate national government’ but also 
obstructed its ‘rationalisation’ and ‘affected both positively and negatively the receptivity to social 
change’ (271). 
 
Levine has helpfully identified two aspects that characterise political culture in North Ethiopia: the 
pervasiveness of hierarchy and the complex beliefs, symbols, and values regarding authority. What 
I find particularly striking about Levine’s analyses, however, is that they say so little about values 
and norms prescribing appropriate behaviour embedded in hierarchical power relations. His 
analysis of the belief system fails to take into account complex relational principles and ideas that 
shape power relations and hierarchical transactions. 
 
Echoes of Levine’s analysis of Ethiopian politics and society have been noticeable in political and 
cultural studies since the publication of his work (see Molvaer 1980, 1995; Lefort 2007). One 
notable example is the work of Donald Donham (1986: 4),9 who saw the Abyssinian (Amhara and 
Tigray) sociocultural formation of ‘… the pre-nineteenth-century period [as] the basis for the new 
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Ethiopian state’. He (1986) sought to describe the Ethiopian state in terms of a system of surplus 
extraction that, he believes, defines the centre-periphery assemblage, building on the Abyssinian 
notions of domination, constraint, and extraction. He wrote: 
The very word in Amharic for nobility, mekwannint, derives indirectly from the verb konene 
which means to discipline, to constrain, to inflict pain. The word for lord, melkenya, derives 
indirectly from the verb meleke meaning variously to vanquish, to govern, to expropriate. The 
notion of extraction in particular was evident in the phrase commonly used to describe the 
appointment of lords to fiefs: they were sent to eat their respective countries (6). 
Donham went on to explain what he described as the ‘unadorned system of force and extraction’ 
(6) that imbues the imperial Ethiopian state system: 
The notion of constraint and extraction to prevent ‘satisfaction’ seems to have pervaded the 
major inequalities in Abyssinian society: the relation between God and his Orthodox Christian 
believers, that between lords and their following, and finally between husband-father and their 
wives and children. With regard to the first, fasting was and is the symbol of adherence to 
Ethiopian Orthodox faith. Its centrality can be appreciated when fasting is seen as God’s 
extraction designed to constrain sinful human nature, to keep believers in line, and to prevent 
the ‘satisfaction’ that encourages people to take more than they have a right to. The 
relationship between lord and their following was seen in much the same light; in fact, the 
word for the lord’s demesne, the field worked by the corvee labour of his peasants, was hudad, 
the same word for the difficult and long Lenten fast. Finally, husband-fathers played the same 
role of disciplining their wives and children. According to a common saying: setinna ahiya 
yale dula aykenam (‘A woman and a donkey can’t be kept straight without the stick’) (1986: 
6). 
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According to Donham’s analysis, the hierarchical relations that frame the Abyssinian society are 
ordered, based on the principles of domination and extraction, into a whole. In this formulation, 
the whole is the phenomenological world – that is, God’s desire to extract sinful human nature – 
and the social and political system is simply its material expression. In other words, the whole 
contains within it and serves as the basis upon which social and political distinctions are 
established.   
 
Recently, Teferi Adem (2004) explored the gaps between the objectives of the national agricultural 
extension programmes and the reality of their implementation in Wollo through the lens of 
‘national political culture’ (85). Building on Levine’s analysis, he argued that the problem of 
implementing extension programmes was complicated by the pervasiveness of cultural 
dispositions, such as habits of suspicion and distrust, a masculine and militaristic ethos, and the 
tendency of national leaders to import foreign ideologies and development programmes. These 
encouraged the tendency to assume the existence of certain cultural dispositions and national 
political culture, rather than testing for it, implying that the nature of political culture is the same 
everywhere. 
 
Other contemporary scholarship has recognised the complex overlap and interface between 
traditional values and formal institutions (see Aalen 2002; Pausewang 2002; Hagmann 2006). The 
study of political culture was given a different theoretical shape by Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil 
Tronvoll (2003), who, using Barnes’s theory of power, moved beyond the ‘waxen form of politics 
in Ethiopia, to illuminate its “golden” alternate [i.e.] the relations and systems of power and 
convention which underpin and give it life and meaning’. They treated power as ‘both function 
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and constitutive feature of the interaction of a social collective’ (25). In so doing, they 
demonstrated the social processes that lead to power relations’ being rooted in the system of social 
networks. Culture holds explanatory value only when we take into account the relations of power 
that shape its production; the different ways in which it is deployed; and the ways in which it 
changes according to different contexts of social life and history, and different circumstances (see 
Vaughan 2003). 
 
This book explores this process and refines these insights by exploring the complex process in 
which hierarchy, culture, and ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault 2007) intersect. While recognising the 
importance of the hierarchical conception of authority in North Ethiopia, I also suggest that our 
theoretical frameworks for studying power relations, authority, and the state in Ethiopia need to 
take more account of resistance and the relational principles that are embedded in the cultural 
conception of hierarchy. Ethiopian history is replete with resistance, including peasant revolts 
(Gebru 1996); banditry (Crummey 1986); armed resistance (Young 1997); and other everyday 
forms of resistance, such as oral poetry (see Getie 1999). It seems to be necessary to ask ourselves 
how one accounts for ‘the endless succession of revolts, part peasant rebellion, part feudal 
jacqueries, repressed in one place only to break out in another’ (Chojnacki 1993: 61)? How does 
one harmonise ‘unremitting deference’ (Levine 1965b: 250) to authority and the pervasiveness of 
resistance? What does the latter tell us about the nature of power relations and the state in Northern 
Ethiopia? 
 
Messay Kebede (1999) offers us a clue to the nexus of power and resistance, i.e., how ‘the art of 
being governed’ and ‘the will not to be governed’ (Foucault 2007) are conceptualised in traditional 
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Ethiopia. Writing about land tenure and governance, he makes a distinction between peasant 
protests that arise due to the abuse of governors and ‘peasant rebellion emerging from deep 
discontent with the system itself’. He argues that while the ‘latter never occurred in Ethiopia, the 
former was frequent’ (Messay 1999: 171). An important implication of this insight is that people 
take the land tenure and hierarchical system of authority for granted, whereas individual actors 
occupying a position of authority are subjected to ‘critical attitude’ (Foucault 2007) and resistance. 
Messay continues that in traditional Ethiopia patrons are expected to be ‘beneficent for the sake of 
justice, in the name of clientship’, and those who refuse to do so end up either betrayed or 
abandoned. However, the patron is not expected to be beneficent on the basis of the principle of 
equality because ‘the high respect for social hierarchy empties justice of the notion of equality’ 
(203). Hierarchy is thus seen to represent the natural order of things. However, at the same time, 
the bases of power and the legitimacy of leaders are not defined by their position within the 
hierarchy but by how people imagine good patrons and good relations with them ought to be, and 
what obligations they think these relations entail. Hence hierarchy, as I demonstrate in Chapter 7, 
is encompassed by cultural and religious values, and the notion that the higher one (God, mengist, 
husband, etc.) encompasses the lower one (the people, family, etc.) in terms of being both more 
powerful and more responsible. This book further expands these insights by exploring the myriad 
ways in which mengist vis-à-vis local officials are culturally constructed in Degga in relation to 
discourses of development and corruption. 
 
The discussion so far has allowed us to see the ways in which power is entailed in culture. Here, 
the distinction made by the Comaroffs (1991) between hegemony and ideology is instructive; the 
former is the nonagentive and hidden face of power, and the latter is the agentive face that refers 
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to highly articulated world views and systems of meaning within a cultural field. To ground these 
ideas in the case at hand, the values that encompass hierarchy constitute the agentive face of power 
in culture (i.e. ideology, which is a self-conscious systems of values and hence contestable), 
whereas hierarchy constitutes the non-agentive aspects that people take for granted as natural. 
Thus, the people and principles (ideologies, value systems) that are embedded in unequal relations 
of power are subject to resistance, while hierarchy or the system that underpins it operates 
unnoticed. Hence, the concept of culture used in this book views culture in terms of power 
relations. It can thus be understood as ‘the space of signifying practice, the semantic ground on 
which human beings seek to construct and represent themselves and others - and, hence, society 
and history’ (Comaroffs 1991: 21). It is a field in which ‘critical attitude’ (Foucault 2007) is 
formed, and domination and resistance take place. 
 
Chapter 7 demonstrates how critical discourse is articulated in corruption discourses and through 
the religious metaphors and idioms that define the roles and obligations involved in governance. 
It informs the ways in which people understand hierarchy and experience and conceptualise the 
state. 
Conclusion	
This chapter examined conceptual problems related to the idea of Ethiopian and state-society 
relations. It also summarised several decades of discussion about the state and society in Ethiopia 
by drawing on a wide range of academic fields. One important question from the literature is 
whether one can describe the state without analysing the politically constructed and idealised 
image whose origins lie in the state itself. In the view of this study, the literature on the Ethiopian 
state, especially ‘the great tradition’ and ethno-nationalist perspectives, are partly categories of 
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thought produced and imposed by successive political regimes. Therefore, in seeking to escape 
such a problem, this book heeds Bourdieu’s (1999: 53) caveat and attempts to avoid ‘…the risk of 
taking over (or being taken over by) a thought of the state, that is, of applying to the state categories 
of thought produced and guaranteed by the state and hence to misrecognize its most profound 
truth’. 
 
On the other hand, the literature concerned with an understanding of the history of the Ethiopian 
state is quiet about the nature of relations between state and society at the local level. Recent 
anthropological writings are also comparatively biased towards what are described as ‘peripheral’ 
parts of the Ethiopian state and rarely focus on the broader question of local governance practices 
in relation to the concept of the state. By contrast, as I have highlighted in this chapter, the ‘core 
area’ is described largely in terms of Levine’s classic work on the Amhara political culture. This 
book, in an explicit endeavour to counter this impasse, attempts an ethnographic account of the 
Ethiopian state in both the core and the periphery areas, with a special emphasis on the former. 
 
The state in Ethiopia is largely viewed in the literature as a centralised apparatus of power which 
acts upon society in the interest of one class, world power, or ethnic group, or another. Viewed 
from an anthropological perspective, these approaches provide us with a limited grasp of the nature 
of the state in Ethiopia. It is therefore imperative in studying the state in sub-Saharan Africa in 
general, and in Ethiopia in particular, in Foucault’s (1980: 121) words, ‘to cut off the King’s head’ 
in favour of examining the state from below. The remainder of this book attempts such an analysis 
in order to empirically demonstrate the nature of the state as it is experienced and lived by local 
people in Ethiopia. 
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1 Although Bayart’s famous metaphor of ‘the rhizome state’ did not include Ethiopia in its 
analysis, the nation is typical of the type of patronage politics that he describes (see de Waal 
2015). 
2 For a comprehensive summary of the literature relating to how Ethiopia imported the various 
instruments of modernity, see Markakis 1974; Addis Hiwet 1975; Bahru 1991, 2008; Andreas 
2003; Clapham 2006. 
3 The Solomonic dynasty consists of rulers of Ethiopia who claimed to trace their roots back to 
Queen Sheba of Ethiopia and King Solomon of Israel (Marcus 1994). 
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4 Historically, the practice of banditry was widely entrenched throughout Northern Ethiopia. 
Bandits operated with impunity within their ‘jurisdictions’ and exercised sovereignty over a 
segment of the population through, at times, a monopoly of violence. Banditry, until the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, was, as Crummey (1986) argues, ‘a tool for career mobility’ 
(33). For example, the first two most prominent modern Ethiopian Emperors, Tewodros II (r. 
1855–1868) and Yohannes IV (r. 1872–1889), came to the throne through banditry. Once they 
assumed power, it was the idea of the state that gave them credibility – or, to use Abrams’s 
(1988) term, ‘legitimatized the illegitimate’ (76). According to Crummey, the use of banditry for 
political office competition by the Ethiopian ruling class is proof of the ‘criminal undercurrents 
of all forms of state power’ (1986: 133). 
5 In Ethiopian historiography, the state that emerged following Menelik’s conquest (see below) is 
commonly considered to be the modern Ethiopian state (see Bahru 1991). The use of the word 
‘modern’ also signifies the inculcation of European instruments of governance, such as 
constitutionalism (see Clapham 2006)  
6 Ethiopia acquired its contemporary shape between 1896 and 1906 through imperial conquest. 
At the turn of the century, Menelik II subdued several kingdoms and societies, including the 
emerging Oromo monarchic states, such as Gera, Gomma, Garo, Gumma, Jimma, and Limmu-
Ennarea as well as other kingdoms, like Kefa, Sidama, Kembata, Wolayta, and the Omotic-
speaking peoples (Bahru 1991; Markakis 2011). 
7 In 1529 the Muslim sultanate of Adal, led by Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi (nicknamed Gragn 
or the left handed), invaded the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia, leading to the partial occupation 
of the Ethiopian highlands for a little more than ten years, between 1529 and 1543 (Bahru 1991; 
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Henze 2000). The eventual defeat of Gragn was immediately followed by the Oromo clan’s 
expansion towards central, northern, and western Ethiopia (see Bahru 1991; Mohammed 1994). 
8 It should be noted that Levine wrote this in 1965, and he would probably not make the same 
comment in the context of current circumstances.  
9 Donald Donham relies prominently on the works of Donald Levine. He also cites accounts of 
early European travellers to substantiate his analysis. 
